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In December of 2005, the New York Times broke the story that the
U.S. government had, since shortly after September 11, 2001, spied
without warrants on international phone calls in apparent contravention
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). 1 Since the story
broke, commentary has abounded as to its implications for the
Constitution's separation of powers. Most commentary has debated
whether the Bush administration indeed violated FISA and, if so,
whether it was constitutionally empowered to do so under Article II of
the Constitution. 2 Also raised, though to a much lesser degree, is
whether the administration was statutorily required to inform the
congressional intelligence committees of its warrantless surveillance
program, whether it violated any such requirement, and whether such a
violation would be constitutional. 3
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. I am grateful to the organizers
of the symposium for which this paper was written, particularly David Gans, Michael Herz, and
Kevin Stack. I also owe many thanks to former Vice President Walter Mondale for a fascinating
and inspiring discussion about congressional oversight of national security activities. Finally, I
am very grateful to Professor Suzanne Thorpe of the University of Minnesota Law Library for her
research assistance and to University of Minnesota co-deans Guy Charles and Fred Morrison for
their continued support.
I James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; see also JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA
AND THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 43-44 (2006); Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Eavesdropping
Effort Began Soon After Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at A44; David E. Sanger,
In Address, Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at Al.
2 See, e.g., David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, The National Security Agency 's Domestic
Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 1357-58 (2005) (summarizing major
documents and arguments); John Cary Sims, What NSA Is Doing ... and Why It's Illegal, 33
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 105, 126-35 (2006); Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Att'y
Gen., to William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 19, 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf [hereinafter DOJ WHITE
PAPER], at 1-3, 6-36.
3 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Macro-Transparency as Structural Directive: A Look at the NSA
Surveillance Controversy, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1163, 1203-05 (2007); Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau,
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Whether the President adequately informed Congress of his actions
is a question as significant and complex as whether those actions violate
the law. In matters of congressional oversight generally, it is difficult
and important to balance the respective values of information flow to
the public, information flow between Congress and the President, and
presidential discretion to act swiftly and secretly. And matters are
substantially more complicated where national security is at issue. Both
executive branch secrecy needs and congressional information needs
often are heightened in this context. Also at issue is what role, if any,
information flow to the public should play.
A major statutory means to reconcile secrecy and openness needs
in the context of inter-branch information-sharing-including in the
statute governing information sharing about the warrantless surveillance
program4-is what this Article calls an "information funnel" approach.
Such an approach focuses on funneling information only to discrete
groups of people. For example, statutory provisions generally require
that intelligence programs be shared with the congressional intelligence
committees. 5  Other statutory provisions permit certain narrowly
defined covert actions to be reported only to the congressional
leadership. 6 The intended benefits of funneling are intuitive. Funneling
plainly is directed toward balancing secrecy needs and openness needs.
It demands some inter-branch knowledge sharing without requiring full
public or even full congressional access.
This Article agrees that funneling is a theoretically and practically
important means of reconciling secrecy and openness needs but
contends that funneling has not, in fact, been taken seriously enough.
The purpose and utility of funneling have been under-explored, and
funneling's propriety and implications thus are poorly understood.
Questions remain, for example, over whether funneling requirements
infringe on the separation of powers and thus need not always be
obeyed. 7 And it is uncertain what if anything should follow from
information funneling-whether, for example, those with whom
information is shared should be able to take some action in response to
what they learn. 8
These uncertainties about funneling are manifest in the debate over
whether the Bush Administration adequately informed Congress about
Full House Committee Gets Briefing on Eavesdropping, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006, at A22;
Charles Babington, White House Agrees to Brief Congress on NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST,
Feb. 9, 2006, at A6; Nancy Pelosi, The Gap in Intelligence Oversight, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,
2006, at B7.
4 See 50 U.S.C.S. §§ 413, 413a, 413b (2007). See also infra text accompanying notes 29-38.
5 Id. §§ 413,413a.
6 Id. § 413b(c), (e).




the warrantless surveillance program in the years before the program
was publicly revealed. A substantial theme in the administration's
defense of its disclosures is that the President may, and indeed must,
limit information sharing as national security requires. 9 Important
questions also have been raised as to whether congresspersons who
were informed of the program could or should have taken some action
in response to the information, or whether their rights and
responsibilities ended with the receipt of the information.' 0
This Article uses the warrantless surveillance controversy as a
jumping-off point to examine the theory and practice of information
funnels. The hope is that information funnels, their constitutional
significance and their potential uses may, through such inquiries,
become better understood and utilized. Part I examines the warrantless
surveillance controversy and its relationship to inter-branch information
sharing. It concludes that two major problems that the controversy
reflects are widespread uncertainty as to whether Congress
constitutionally may force the President to disclose information and a
lack of careful consideration as to how any information funneling
requirements should work. Part II lays a theoretical foundation for
improving governing statutes and congressional rules. Part II(A)
explains that Congress has the constitutional authority to set
information-sharing requirements between the executive branch and
itself. Part II(B) discusses the complicated relationships between the
respective benefits of secrecy and openness, an understanding of which
should guide information sharing rules. Building on Part II's theoretical
foundations, Part III suggests some answers to the questions raised in
Part I as to how information funneling requirements should work.
I. INTER-BRANCH INFORMATION SHARING AND THE WARRANTLESS
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
A. The Warrantless Surveillance Program and the Debate Over its
Legality
Shortly after September 11, 2001, the National Security Agency
began secretly to employ warrantless electronic surveillance of some
calls between the United States and foreign nations." In 2002,
President Bush issued a secret executive order authorizing the
warrantless surveillance program.' 2 On December 19, 2005, an article
9 See infra text accompanying notes 42-44.
10 See infra Part I.B.2.
I I See supra note 1.
12 See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 1; Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan & Jennifer K.
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in the New York Times revealed the program's existence to the public.1 3
After the story broke, commentators began to debate whether the
program violates the law. Some considered whether the program
oversteps Fourth Amendment limits on warrantless wiretapping. 14
Many questioned whether the program violates FISA.' 5 Under FISA,
warrantless surveillance is barred with respect to communications to or
from a U.S. citizen or legal alien in the United States and
communications to or from any "person in the United States, without
the consent" of at least one party thereto.' 6 Warrant applications must
be made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under provisions
that facilitate much secrecy. Under FISA, the pre-surveillance warrant
requirement is lifted in two circumstances. First, where the Attorney
General certifies "that emergency conditions make it impossible to
obtain [a warrant] with due diligence" before surveillance begins. In
such cases, a warrant application still must be made within 72 hours
after the Attorney General authorizes surveillance. Second, electronic
surveillance may be conducted "without a court order for fifteen
calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress.' 17
The administration's arguments about FISA consist of two main
parts. First, the administration contends that its actions are authorized
by statute. It argues that FISA must be read together with the
Authorization to Use Military Force [AUMF] passed by Congress in the
days following September 11 th. 18 The AUMF authorized the President
"to use all necessary and appropriate force" against those involved with
the attacks of September 1lth. 19 The administration contends that the
AUMF implicitly authorizes the NSA surveillance program to
determine who was involved in the attacks and against whom force
should be used.20 Second, the administration "argues that, even if the
AUMF does not directly authorize the NSA program, the Constitution
inherently empowers the President to create such a program. And while
the administration often avoids saying it definitively, it repeatedly
indicates that any legislation that conflicts with such inherent power
probably is unconstitutional."' 21 The administration bases its statutory
Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, Am. Law Div (Jan. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf.
13 See supra note 1.
14 See, e.g., Letter from Law Professors Curtis A. Bradley et al., to Members of Congress
(Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/doj-response.pdf [hereinafter Law
Professors Letter].
15 See supra note 2.
16 50 U.S.C.S. § 1801(f) (2007).
17 See Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1188-90 (citing FISA and secondary sources).
18 DOJ White Paper, supra note 2, at 17-18.
19 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
20 DOJ White Paper, supra note 2, at 10-13.
21 Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1196, 1198 nn.232-33 and accompanying text.
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interpretation in large part on its constitutional arguments. That is, it
asserts that its statutory interpretation should be adopted to avoid the
constitutional conflict that otherwise would be raised between FISA and
the President's powers under Article II of the Constitution. 22
Opponents of the warrantless surveillance program dispute the
administration's statutory and constitutional points. On the statutory
front, opponents argue that the general language of the AUMF does not
override FISA's specific requirements for electronic surveillance. 23
They further note that FISA provides a fifteen-day exemption from its
requirements following a congressional declaration of war and that
FISA was amended several times after the AUMF's passage. Both the
fifteen-day exemption and the post-AUMF amendments would be
superfluous, opponents argue, had the AUMF implicitly overridden
FISA. 24 On the constitutional points, opponents argue that Congress
and the President share powers in both military and domestic affairs,
that domestic surveillance falls well within Congress' legislative
powers, and that the President thus must conduct any operations within
FISA's parameters. 25
B. Administration Disclosures to Congresspersons Prior to the
Program's Public Revelation
Also discussed in the wake of the program's public revelation,
though much less so, is whether the administration adequately informed
Congress about the program before it became public. Prior to the
program's public revealing, the administration notified only members of
the Congressional leadership, or "Gang of Eight," consisting of "the
chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional
intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House
of Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate. '26 Opponents charge that the administration was obligated to
inform the full intelligence committees. 27 Opponents also argue that
notification occurred under such constrained conditions that informed
members had no means to seek recourse in response to the
information. 28
22 See DOJ White Paper, supra note 2, at 28-36.
23 See, e.g., Law Professors Letter, supra note 14, at 3; Sims, supra note 2, at 128-30.
24 See, e.g., Law Professors Letter, supra note 14, at 3-5; Sims, supra note 2, at 128-30.
25 See, e.g., Law Professors Letter, supra note 14, at 6-7; Sims, supra note 2, at 131-32.
26 Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1204 nn.252-56 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., id at 1204-05; see also sources cited at supra note 3.
28 See infra Part I.B.2; see also, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1204 nn.255-56.
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1. Limiting Notice to the Gang of Eight
The legal dimensions of notification are shaped largely by the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended. The intelligence
community's current statutory disclosure responsibilities include
requirements that the President "ensure that the congressional
intelligence committees are kept fully and currently informed of...
intelligence activities . . . including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity" 29 and that the Director of National Intelligence
[DNI] and the intelligence agency heads similarly "keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
all intelligence activities," including through written reports on
"significant anticipated intelligence activity. '30 In carrying out these
duties, the DNI must show "due regard for the protection from
unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive
intelligence sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive
matters." 31
A separate statutory provision requires "Presidential approval and
reporting of covert actions. '32  Covert actions are distinct from
intelligence activities. The former is limited to "an activity or activities
of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged
publicly. '33  Covert actions do not include "activities the primary
purpose of which is to acquire intelligence. ' 34 While the intelligence
committees generally must be notified of covert actions, 35 initial notice
may be limited to the Gang of Eight36 where the President deems such
limitation "essential ... to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting
vital interests of the United States. ' 37 When initial notice is restricted to
the Gang of Eight, "the President shall fully inform the congressional
intelligence committees in a timely fashion and shall provide a
statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice. '38
To justify having limited its disclosures about the NSA
surveillance program to the Gang of Eight, the administration relies on
statutory and constitutional arguments that parallel those which it makes
29 50 U.S.C.S. § 413(a)(1) (2007).
30 Id. § 413a(a)(1), (b).
31 Id. § 413a(a).
32 Id. § 413b (2007).
33 Id. § 413b(e).
34 Id. § 413b(e)(1).
35 Id. § 413b(b), (c)(1).
36 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
37 50 U.S.C. § 413b(c)(2).
38 Id. § 413b(c)(3).
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to justify the program's legality generally. First, the administration
argues that its actions fall within a statutory exception to full committee
disclosure requirements. Second, the administration's broader
statements about its right to keep secrets-both about the program and
generally-imply a view that it constitutionally may determine when to
circumvent statutory notice requirements.
On the statutory issue, the administration points to the requirement
that the DNI carry out its informing duties "[t]o the extent consistent
with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters. '39 The administration
argues that this language "gives the Executive Branch flexibility to brief
only certain members of the intelligence committees where more
widespread briefings would pose an unacceptable risk to the national
security. '40  The administration quotes the Congressional Research
Service [CRS] to the effect that "the leaders of the intelligence
committees 'over time have accepted the executive branch practice of
limiting notification of intelligence activities in some cases to either the
Gang of Eight, or to the chairmen and ranking members of the
intelligence committees.'" 41
The debate over the adequacy of disclosures has been relatively
limited and the administration's explicit explanations have not strayed
far beyond its statutory argument. Yet one can infer a sub-textual
argument that the Constitution demands leeway for the President to
circumvent statutory disclosure requirements that he deems antithetical
to national security. This point follows from the administration's
support generally for a strong constitutional executive privilege to keep
secrets.42 The point also seems implicit in the administration's many
references to the need for secrecy regarding the warrantless surveillance
program's existence. The administration makes such arguments with
respect both to Congress as a whole 43 and to the full intelligence
committees' memberships.44  The arguments are relevant to the
39 Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority-
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 136 (2006), available at
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2006-hr/nsasurv.pdf [hereinafter Gonzales Transcript] (quoting 50
U.S.C. § 413a(a)).
40 Id. at 137.
41 Id. at 138 (quoting Memorandum from Alfred Cumming, Specialist in Intelligence and
Nat'l Sec., Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, Cong. Research Serv. Statutory
Procedures Under Which Congress is to be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including
Covert Actions 10 (Jan. 18, 2004), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m0 1806.pdf.).
42 See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92
IOWA L. REV. 489, 491 n.3 and accompanying text, 492 nn.10- 11 and accompanying text, 497-
501 (2007).
43 Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 19, 41, 76-77, 80, 130-31.
44 Id. at 83, 137-38.
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administration's statutory disclosure obligations only if they either
justify invoking a statutory exemption from disclosure or if the
administration unilaterally may adjust its disclosure obligations as it
deems necessary. Considering that the administration references the
need for secrecy about the program regularly and generally-apart from
its statutory interpretation point,-and considering the administration's
support for executive privilege, its references seem at least partly to
reflect the view that it constitutionally may circumvent disclosure
obligations as it deems necessary.
The administration's statutory interpretation argument is weak. As
noted above, the statutory provision on which the administration relies
is the provision that the DNI must, in carrying out his or her informing
duties, "show 'due regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters."'' 45 It is
not clear, however, that this provision encompasses the power to limit
notice to the Gang of Eight. The statute explicitly raises only the
possibility of limiting covert action notice to the Gang of Eight,46 and
this option is carefully constrained by requirements of eventual written
notice to the intelligence committees and an explanation for the delay.47
Even if the provision encompasses the power to limit notice to the
Gang of Eight, the administration cannot seriously contend it is
applicable here. With respect to the "sources and methods" exception, I
have noted elsewhere that "the only source or method arguably
protected by non-disclosure to Congress is the 'method' of operating a
program in contravention of [FISA]. Such an exception would not only
swallow the rule, it would make an utter mockery of it. ''48 A similar
point can be made regarding the "exceptionally sensitive matters"
exception. To this day, the administration has offered no explanation of
the purported dangers of revealing the program's very existence beyond
the vague assertion that, while terrorists surely already know that the
United States can survey their conversations, knowing about the
program would remind them of this fact49 and might lead them to infer
that surveillance is broader than they had assumed. 50 The weakness of
the administration's rationale for secrecy substantially undermines its
concerns about public revelations. And certainly, such weakness deeply
undermines the administration's rationale for not disclosing information
to the intelligence committees' memberships. 51 More concretely, the
45 See id. at 83, 136-38 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)).
46 50 U.S.C.S. § 413b(c)(2).
47 Id. § 413b(c)(2), (3), (4).
48 Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1205 n.257.
49 See Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 107.
50 Id.
51 The rationale is further undermined by the administration's willingness to disclose
1056 [Vol. 29:3
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rationale simply cannot justify invoking the statutory exception for
"exceptionally sensitive matters" unless the exception were to overtake
the rule.
As noted above, the administration also quotes the CRS to the
effect that "the leaders of the intelligence committees 'over time have
accepted the executive branch practice of limiting notification of
intelligence activities in some cases to either the Gang of Eight, or to
the chairmen and ranking members of the intelligence committees."'' 52
However, CRS only raises this point as an argument that the executive
branch might make,53 and its only support for the statement is a
complaint made by then House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi to this
effect.54 This hardly establishes widespread congressional acceptance
of the practice.5 5 Furthermore, even if such practice is widely accepted,
such acceptance by itself does not amend a statutory requirement.
Additionally, the CRS Report does not indicate the circumstances under
which this practice occurs. If this practice occurs with the case-by-case
knowledge and agreement of the full intelligence committee
memberships, then arguably it is consistent with the statutory
requirements. If, on the other hand, the Gang of Eight and the
administration alone have knowledge of these limited disclosures then
such disclosures would fly in the face of the statutory requirements
unless they meet one of the narrow statutory exceptions.
Given the weakness of its statutory arguments, the administration's
defense of its disclosures rises or falls on whether it constitutionally
may circumvent statutory disclosure requirements in the name of
national security. The argument for such executive branch discretion is
addressed substantively in Part II. For now, it suffices to note that the
argument and its refutation are fundamental to any reform of the inter-
branch disclosure system. If the argument is widely accepted then it is
only to be expected that administration withholding of information from
Congress, and the acquiescence of congresspersons in constraints on
their receiving information, will be commonplace. Indeed, belief in the
argument or its political resonance seems implicit in the
administration's defense of its limited disclosures and in the Gang of
information to the committees upon being pressured politically-particularly on the eve of such
politically charged events as Michael Hayden's confirmation hearings to lead the CIA-after the
initial press revelations had occurred. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senators Left Out of Loop
Make Their Pique Known, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A20; DENIS MCDONOUGH ET AL., CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS, No MERE OVERSIGHT: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE IS
BROKEN 22-23 (June 2006) [hereinafter CAP REPORT].
52 Gonzales Transcript, supra note 38, at 138.
53 CUMMING, supra note 41, at 10.
54 Id.
55 The Center for American Progress concludes, in fact, that there is no well-established
practice of bypassing the full Intelligence Committees in favor of the Gang of Eight. CAP
REPORT, supra note 51, at 20.
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Eight's acquiescence-however Gang of Eight members might lament
that acquiescence 56-in the same.
2. Constraints on Information Recipients
Another point of contention is whether the administration's
disclosures to the Gang of Eight were meaningful. The administration
argues that the disclosures constituted a genuine check on its conduct. 57
The administration and its supporters say that informed congresspersons
could have publicized the information or informed others in Congress
had they been genuinely concerned. 58 White House counsel Dan
Bartlett said that those briefed would have been "screaming from the
mountaintops" had they thought that illegal activity was occurring.59
And Senator Grassley argued at a Judiciary Committee hearing that
briefed congresspersons who were genuinely concerned about the
program "were... not doing their job of congressional oversight as
they should have, informing the other Members of Congress that there
is really something wrong that the President is doing here. '60 Attorney
General Gonzales made a similar point at the same hearing, saying that
"we are letting Members of Congress off the hook easily by saying that
if they get briefed into a secret program and they believe it is against the
law, that they can't do anything about it.''61
Critics charge, however, that the briefings were meaningless due to
the scant nature of the information conveyed and the conditions
imposed on those briefed. Gang of Eight member Senator Rockefeller
said, for example, that the information provided to the Gang of Eight
"hardly amounted to briefings, particularly in contrast to details that
Bush and top aides have publicly released in claiming its success at
thwarting terrorist attacks. '62 Furthermore, some briefed lawmakers
expressed concern to the administration after their briefings and their
56 See, e.g., Pelosi, supra note 3; Eric Lichtblau & David E. Sanger, Administration Cites War
Vote in Spying Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2005, at Al.
57 See, e.g., Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 27, 50, 57-58, 83-84; Suzanne E.
Spaulding, Power Play: Did Bush Roll Past the Legal Stop Signs?, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005,
at B 1; Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Varied Rationales Muddle Issue of NSA Eavesdropping,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2006, at A5. Indeed, the administration often notes simply that it disclosed
the program "to Congress," without citing the very limited pool of congresspersons informed. Id.
58 See, e.g., Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 30, 116-17; Eggen & Pincus, supra note
57.
59 Eggen & Pincus, supra note 57.
60 Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 30.
61 Id. at 116-17.
62 Spencer S. Hsu & Walter Pincus, Goss Says Leaks Have Hurt CIA's Work, Urges Probe.
NSA Eavesdropping Defended at Briefing, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2006, at A3.
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concerns apparently went unaddressed. 63 Most importantly, critics point
out that Gang of Eight members were told that they could reveal none of
the shared information as a condition of the briefing.64 Lawmakers thus
were not allowed to consult staff members for assistance in
understanding the information or to conduct further research. Nor were
they allowed to pass the information on to other congresspersons or the
public. 65
One former congressional staff member says that such problems
are typical of Gang of Eight briefings. The staffer writes:
As a former legal counsel for both Republican and Democratic
leaders of the House and Senate intelligence committees, I'm well
aware of the limitations of these "gang of eight" sessions. They are
provided only to the leadership of the House and Senate and of the
intelligence committees, with no staff present. The eight are
prohibited from saying anything about the briefing to anyone,
including other intelligence panel members. The leaders for whom I
worked never discussed the content of these briefings with me.
It is virtually impossible for individual members of Congress,
particularly members of the minority party, to take any effective
action if they have concerns about what they have heard in one of
these briefings. It is not realistic to expect them, working alone, to
sort through complex legal issues, conduct the kind of factual
investigation required for true oversight and develop an appropriate
legislative response. 66
C. Post-Revelation Hearings and Their Relationship to Information
Funneling
Congressional hearings held (and decisions not to hold others)
since the program was publicly revealed also reflect information
funneling issues. When a national security program is the topic of a
congressional hearing, questions inevitably arise as to what should be
revealed in a public hearing, what should be revealed in a closed (non-
public) hearing and what should not be revealed at all. Such questions
have been manifest since the program's public revelation in the
following contexts: (1) challenges by the administration and by some in
63 Dan Eggen, Limiting NSA Spying is Inconsistent with Rationale, Critics Say, WASH. POST,
Feb. 8, 2006, at A5; Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note 56; David E. Sanger, In Address, Bush Says
He Ordered Domestic Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at Al.
64 See, e.g., Pelosi, supra note 3; Spaulding, supra note 57; Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note
56.
65 See, e.g., Pelosi, supra note 3; Spaulding, supra note 57; Lichtblau & Sanger, supra note
56.
66 Spaulding, supra note 57.
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Congress to the propriety of holding public hearings on the basis that
such hearings will inform "the enemy"; 67 (2) refusals by the
administration to permit some officials to testify before Congress; 68 (3)
refusals by officials to answer some questions in public hearings;69 and
(4) refusals by the administration to reveal some information to the full
Congress or the full intelligence committees at all.70 These issues
embody the same questions embodied in the debate over pre-public-
revelation disclosures. That is, they encompass questions as to whether
Congress constitutionally can require the executive branch to disclose
information and what such requirements, including information
funneling components, should look like.
D. Conclusion to Part 1: Some Major Problems in the Current System
The warrantless surveillance controversy thus reflects at least two
sets of problems with the existing system of information sharing. First,
administrations do not necessarily comply with statutory directives to
share information, and individual congresspersons may acquiesce in,
even facilitate, such non-compliance. These phenomena appear
grounded in the view that the Constitution gives the President discretion
not to comply or at least in the view that this constitutional
interpretation is politically acceptable, even popular, and that
challenging it poses political dangers. Even where Congress attempts to
balance secrecy's dangers and benefits through funneling requirements,
then, such requirements are unlikely to be consistently effective. A
strong defense of Congress' constitutional prerogative to impose
information disclosure requirements thus is in order. Second, while
there seems to be broad agreement that information funneling of some
kind is a desirable tool, there has been relatively little care paid to the
details of such funneling and to the principles that should underscore
those details. This problem is manifest in disputes between the
administration, which argues that its briefings to the Gang of Eight
about the warrantless surveillance program were meaningful, and
administration opponents who charge that such briefings were mere
"check the box" exercises that offered no avenue for responsive
congressional action. The problem similarly is manifest in disputes
over the sufficiency of disclosures by the administration after the
67 See, e.g., Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 15; Eric Lichtblau & Sheryl Gay Stolberg,
Accord in House to Hold Inquiry on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al.
68 See, e.g., Lichtblau & Stolberg, supra note 67.
69 See, e.g., Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 17, 78, 84, 93, 95-96, i02-03, 120-21,
151-52, 160-61.
70 See, e.g., id. at 149-50, 152-53, 158-59, 198; Shane & Lichtblau, supra note 3.
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program came to the public's attention.
II. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED APPROACH
Part II builds theoretical foundations to address the problems about
information-funneling that the warrantless surveillance controversy
reflects. Part II(A) makes the case for Congress' constitutional
authority to impose information-sharing requirements on the executive
branch. Part II(B) provides theoretical tools to consider what types of
funneling requirements Congress, given its constitutional authority to
impose them, should create.
A. Congress' Constitutional Power to Impose Disclosure
Requirements on the Executive Branch
The White House has frequently voiced support for a constitutional
''executive privilege" whereby the President has a constitutional
prerogative to refuse to disclose information to Congress. 71 The current
administration, while perhaps unusually wedded to secrecy,7 2 is far from
alone in its interpretation of a constitutional executive privilege.
Similar interpretations have been embraced by previous administrations,
some courts and some academics. 73
The argument for a constitutional executive privilege consists of
two main points. First, although "executive privilege" or equivalent
terms appear nowhere in the constitutional text, the privilege's
supporters argue that it is implicit in the President's Article II duties. 74
Specifically, supporters argue that the President cannot faithfully fulfill
his duties to execute the law and to serve as Commander-in-Chief
unless he can control dissemination of his office's information to ensure
candid discussions with his advisors and to protect national security. 75
Second, supporters argue that history demonstrates that those who
framed and ratified the Constitution expected the President to have the
prerogative to keep secrets from Congress. Supporters argue, first, that
this is demonstrated by a series of post-ratification incidents in which
Presidents refused to disclose requested information. 76 They also rely
71 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 497-501.
72 See, e.g., id at 491 n.3 and accompanying text.
73 See, e.g., id at 496-97, 500-06, 506 n.79; MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 19-71 (2002).
74 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 492.
75 Id. at 492, 501-03, 505-06.
76 See id at 506, 511 n. 105; ROZELL, supra note 73, at 28-37.
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heavily on two Federalist Papers, one by Alexander Hamilton and one
by John Jay. Each paper touts as a major advantage of the American
presidency its relative capacity for secrecy as opposed to the diminished
secret-keeping capacity of a multi-member body.77
Elsewhere, I have explained in some detail why I believe that these
arguments are incorrect and why statutorily based information requests
cannot constitutionally be refused by the executive branch. 78  The
following passage summarizes major aspects of the argument against a
constitutional executive privilege and in favor of a congressional
prerogative to demand information from the executive branch: 79
[I]t simply does not follow from the executive branch's institutional
skill at secret-keeping that it has a legal prerogative to keep secrets in
the face of checking mechanisms, including congressional requests.
Saikrishna Prakash makes this point in his analysis of executive
privilege doctrine. Prakash points out that historical references to
Presidential secrecy "'hardly demonstrate that the proposed
executive would enjoy a constitutional right to an executive
privilege.' The references instead serve only to describe 'one of the
common attributes of a single executive .... In the ordinary course,
the President would be able to keep some matters secret.' Whether
the President has a constitutional right to keep secrets in the face of
Congressional requests is another matter." 80
Constitutional structure, text and history not only fail to equate
Presidential secret-keeping capacity with a secret-keeping right, they
indicate that Presidential capacity necessitates robust structural
checking. As I have explained elsewhere, the Constitution designs a
system that seems to leave room only for political branch secrecy
that itself can be checked through the political process.81 Thus,
while the President has much capacity to engage in secret activities,
secrecy's dangers are mitigated because Congress may pass
legislation limiting such activities or permitting itself or others to
obtain information under certain conditions. 82 This constitutional
design is evidenced by a number of factors. First, there is a negative
correlation between the relative openness of each political branch
and the relative control that each branch has over the other.
Congress is a relatively transparent and dialogue-driven branch, and
its core tasks are to pass laws that the executive branch executes and
77 Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 506.
78 See generally id. Cf Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1173-81.
79 The long quotation that follows is from Heidi Kitrosser, Classified Information Leaks and
Free Speech, ILLINOIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=958099. The internal citations are included
but modified slightly for consistency.
80 Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 508 (quoting Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, A Critical
Comment on the Constitutionality of Executive Privilege, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1143, 1176 (1999).
81 See Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 493-96; Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1173-81.
82 See Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 493-96; Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1173-81.
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to oversee such execution. The executive branch, in contrast, is
capable of much secrecy, but also is largely beholden to legislative
directives in order to act. This creates a rather brilliant structure in
which the executive branch can be given vast leeway to operate in
secret, but remains subject to being overseen or otherwise restrained
in its secrecy by the legislature.83 Second, historical references to
secrecy as an advantage of the unitary President-particularly two
widely cited Federalist papers-also cite accountability and the
ability of other branches and the people to uncover wrongdoing as a
major advantage of the unitary President. This indicates, again, a
balanced constitutional design whereby Presidential secrecy is
expected but remains on a leash of political accountability. 84 Third,
the only explicit textual reference to secrecy occurs in Article I, § 5,
of the Constitution, which requires Congress to keep journals of its
proceedings, but allows each chamber to exempt "such Parts as may
in their Judgment require Secrecy." 85 That fact by itself does not tell
us very much, as one could argue that a secret-keeping prerogative is
intrinsic in the President's executive and commander-in-chief duties.
What it does reflect, however, is a constitutional structure that
permits secrecy only under conditions that will ensure some political
awareness of and ability to check such secrecy. "The very framing
of the congressional secrecy provision as an exception to an
openness mandate, combined with [a logical and historical]
expectation that a large and deliberative legislative body generally
will operate in sunlight ... suggest a framework wherein final
decisions as to political secrecy are trusted only to bodies likely to
face internal and external pressures against such secrecy." 86 Finally,
an executive branch that can keep secrets but that can be reigned in
by Congress reflects the most logical reconciliation of competing
constitutional values. On the one hand, the Constitution clearly
values transparency as an operative norm. This is evidenced by
myriad factors, including the necessities of self-government, the First
Amendment, and Article I's detailed requirements for a relatively
open and dialogic legislative process. 87 On the other hand, the
Constitution reflects an understanding that secrecy sometimes is a
necessary evil, evidenced both by the congressional secrecy
allowance and by the President's structural secrecy capabilities. 88
Permitting executive branch secrecy, but requiring it to operate
within legislative parameters themselves open and subject to
revision, largely reconcile these two values. 89
83 See Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1167-81.
84 See Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 511 n.105, 524-26.
85 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
86 Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 523.
87 Id. at 515-20.
88 Id. at 520-22.
89 Id. at 522.
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B. Theoretical Tools to Guide the Crafting of Information Funneling
Rules
That Congress constitutionally may impose disclosure
requirements does not tell us what the requirements should look like.
This subpart identifies major factors that should guide the crafting or
review of such requirements. Specifically, this subpart assesses the
respective costs and benefits offered by openness and secrecy in the
realm of national security oversight. It also suggests some guidelines to
maximize these benefits and minimize these costs in shaping
information funneling rules.
1. Secrecy's Costs and Benefits in the Context of Congressional
Oversight of National Security Activities
It is hardly news that secrecy has costs and benefits. 90 What is
striking about these costs and benefits is that they often consist not only
of competing values (e.g., democratic openness versus national security)
but also of competing means of achieving the same value (e.g., national
security through openness versus national security through secrecy). 91
Additionally, inter-value and intra-value competition can exist and
impact one another simultaneously. For example, openness
paradoxically can be furthered by secrecy to the extent that candor may
more likely emerge in a closed, confidential conversation than in a
public one. At the same time, the degree to which confidentiality
furthers candor may fluctuate with the extent to which those disclosing
information believe (or credibly can argue) that wider disclosures would
harm national security. This example also raises the question of
whether the openness fostered by confidentiality serves related ends
such as accountability or security, or whether the secretive nature of the
disclosures stymies their ability to further ends beyond themselves.
The various values at stake-whether competing against one
another or generating competition over the best means to achieve the
same value-can be grouped into two rough categories. As indicated
90 For discussion of secrecy's costs and benefits, see, e.g., SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE
ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 18-26, 102-115, 171-209, 249-64 (1982); Adam M.
Samaha, Government Secrets, Constitutional Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention, 53
UCLA L. REV. 909, 917-18, 922-23 (2006); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91
IOWA L. REV. 885, 895-910 (2006); Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 6-12
(1991).
91 See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 7-40
(1998); BOK, supra note 90, at 194-96; Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 537-41.
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by the immediately preceding examples, those categories are national
security and democratic deliberation. Subsections (a) and (b) elaborate
on the contents of each category and major arguments regarding how
secrecy advances and inhibits each one.
a. National Security and Related Values
The protection of national security is a key value invoked in
debates over the advisability of sharing information with Congress.92
The value encompasses the protection of national security and means
toward that end. Such means might include, for example, ensuring
efficiency and sound judgment in national security operations,
facilitating the cooperation of allied nations and the support of the
American people, and preventing enemies of the nation from learning
information that could help them in their anti-U.S. operations.
i. Arguments against Disclosure
Throughout history, members of the executive branch have argued
that national security would be harmed by their acquiescing to
congressional requests for information. 93 The potential reach of such
arguments is exemplified by claims that publicly debating wartime
strategy with Congress threatens national security by undermining troop
morale and popular support.94
Another argument made against information disclosures is that
disclosures hinder the efficacy of internal executive branch operations
and deliberations and thus ultimately hurt national security.95 This is a
subset of more general executive branch concerns to the effect that
candor and efficacy in intra-executive branch deliberations are impacted
negatively by participants' awareness that they might be disclosed. 96
Of course, the most intuitive and ubiquitous argument for
withholding information is that the information could help enemy
nations, persons or organizations. It follows that the information must
remain a closely guarded secret to prevent it from falling into enemies'
hands. This argument pervades political discourse over the recent NSA
surveillance controversies. As noted earlier, for example, the Bush
92 See, e.g., supra notes 67-70.
93 See, e.g., ROZELL;supra note 73, at 43-46, 60, 68-69, 112-13.
94 See, e.g., Michael Abramowitz, War's Critics Abetting Terrorists, Cheney Says, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 2006, at A12; Liza Porteus, Bush Fires Back Against Iraq War Critics, FOX
NEWS, Nov. 13, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,175296,00.html.
95 See, e.g., Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 149-50, 152-53, 158-59, 198.
96 See ROZELL, supra note 73, at 46-48.
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Administration argues that it could not have sought specific legislation
to authorize the warrantless surveillance program without "inform[ing]
our enemies about what we are doing and how we are doing it. '' 97 And
they claim that national security has been damaged by press reports on
the program, as such reports "remind" the enemy that "we are involved
in some kind of surveillance."98
ii. Arguments Favoring Disclosure
Arguments also can be advanced to the effect that secrecy often is
at best unnecessary and at worst deeply harmful to national security. To
begin with, there is good reason to question the conventional
assumption that there are volumes of information of which it would be
dangerous for enemies to learn. Players from across the political
spectrum long have suggested that much of the information classified in
the United States should not be classified. 99 In one striking example,
Erwin N. Griswold, the former solicitor general of the United States
who fought on behalf of the Nixon administration to restrain publication
of the classified Pentagon Papers, acknowledged years after the
litigation: "I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national
security from the [Papers'] publication. Indeed, I have never seen it
even suggested that there was such an actual threat."1 00 In the same
discussion, Griswold deemed it "apparent to any person who has
considerable experience with classified material that there is massive
overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not
with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of
one sort or another."1 01
There are persuasive arguments not only that national security
based secrecy needs are dramatically overstated, but that excessive
secrecy hurts national security by encouraging poorly informed and
under-vetted decision-making and diminishing the United States'
domestic and international credibility. As I have noted elsewhere:
[C]ountless scholars, journalists, legislators and executive branch
officials have noted secrecy's judgment-clouding and security-
hindering effects in relation to historic and current events. For
examples of such criticism, one needs to look no further than
commentary on the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It has been argued
repeatedly that the reticence of the press and of Congress to ask
97 Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 41.
98 Id. at 107.
99 See Kitrosser, supra note 79.
100 Erwin N. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and Classified Information,
WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25.
101 Id
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difficult questions prior to the invasion of Iraq combined with the
Bush administration's penchant for secrecy created an insular White
House environment in which debate was stifled, "groupthink"
flourished, and questionable data on weapons of mass destruction
were embraced while predictions of a peaceful, post-invasion Iraq
similarly went unquestioned.
Similar concerns have been raised about the negative impact of
secrecy on homeland security, both prior to, and in the wake of, 9-
11.
Similar analyses about more distant historical events [including the
Vietnam War and the Cold War] abound.
[There also is a risk] that secrecy not only will be misused by well-
meaning yet overzealous officials, but that it will intentionally be
misused by those set on manipulating public debate toward their own
ends. Indeed, McCarthy's exploitation of government secrecy calls
to mind Vice President Cheney's recent attempts to perpetuate the
theory of a link between Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein through
vague public allusions to evidence in the administration's possession
of which others, including the 9-11 Commission, supposedly were
not aware. Similarly, concerns long have been raised about
executive branch "spinning of information" through selective
declassification or leakage of otherwise classified information.10 2
Such points are manifest in responses to the administration's
arguments for keeping the NSA surveillance program largely secret.
For one thing, critics charge that no convincing explanation has been
offered as to why it would have endangered national security to reveal
the program's bare existence to the public, let alone to the congressional
intelligence committees. 10 3 And while public details of the program
remain too scarce as of mid-2007 to evaluate its effectiveness, efficacy
concerns intrinsically are raised by the insular nature of the decision-
making process that generated the program. 0 4 These efficacy concerns
are exacerbated by post-revelation disclosures that raise questions about
the program's reach, the adequacy of its oversight and mistakes that
102 Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 537-40 (internal citations omitted).
103 See, e.g., Kitrosser, supra note 3, at 1200-02; George F. Will, No Checks, Many
Imbalances, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006, at A27; Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 107.
104 For example, Attorney General Gonzales, at various points in testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, made vague references to solely intra-executive branch checks on the
program and also cited his own lack of knowledge or analysis on aspects of the program's make-
up or legality. See, e.g., Gonzales Transcript, supra note 39, at 12, 33-36, 61, 94-95, 100-01,
109-10, 114-16. See also, e.g., RISEN, supra note 1, at 46 (discussing very insular, secretive
nature of decision-making processes about the program).
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might have occurred in administering it. 105
b. Democratic Deliberation and Related Values
The other major value invoked in debates about national security
disclosures can be called democratic deliberation. This value
encompasses at least three different types of deliberations: intra-
executive branch deliberations, deliberations between Congress and the
executive branch, and deliberations that include the public. Unlike
national security, democratic deliberation is not necessarily an end in
itself. On the one hand, one can draw upon political and constitutional
theory for the view that public knowledge, dialogic participation and
input through voting has intrinsic value. 106  Similarly, inter-branch
dialogue-and to a lesser extent intra-branch dialogue--can contribute
to intrinsically valuable public knowledge and participation by
generating and spreading information and dialogue that might make its
way to the public. Furthermore, to the extent that ours is not a direct
democracy but a system in which voters are represented by deliberating
government branches, deliberations within and among these branches
may have intrinsic value. On the other hand, democratic deliberation of
all three kinds can be instrumental means of reaching other values,
including national security, by increasing the intellectual input that goes
into decision-making. Democratic deliberation also can contribute to
the rule of law by spreading knowledge of illegalities that might then be
challenged politically or in courts.
i. Arguments Against Disclosures
A common deliberation-based argument against disclosures is the
candor argument discussed earlier.1 07 That is, disclosures and related
discussions are less likely to be candid, robust and productive when
participants know that their statements may be shared with others. This
105 See, e.g., Ever-Expanding Secret, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A32; Privileged
Conversations Not Excluded From Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2006, at A10; Charles
Babington & Dan Eggen, Gonzales Seeks to Clarify Testimony on Spying, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,
2006, at A8; Barton Gellman, Dafna Linzer & Carol D. Leonnig, Surveillance Net Yields Few
Suspects: NSA's Hunt for Terrorists Scrutinizes Thousands of Americans, but Most Are Later
Cleared, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2006, at Al.
106 Cf Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593-95 (1982)
(making the closely related argument that free speech ultimately serves the end of individual self-
realization, with each individual's use of free speech, whether for political or for other purposes,
constituting a means toward self-realization (whether their own or their listeners')).
107 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
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argument can take both instrumental and intrinsic forms that parallel
those made about democratic deliberation generally. Instrumentally, the
argument is that decision-making quality will be compromised by
stunted deliberations. This can negatively impact national security or
other ends toward which the decision-making is directed. One also
might find intrinsic value, in an indirect democracy, in robust, candid
exchanges within government branches.
The intrinsic and instrumental forms of the candor argument can be
applied to intra-branch and inter-branch discussions alike. The
arguments as applied to intra-executive branch discussions essentially
mirror those made in the previous paragraph. As applied to discussions
with Congress, the arguments are more complex. An absolute anti-
disclosure stance toward Congress, of course, would make deliberations
between the executive branch and Congress about non-public
information impossible. On the other hand, more moderate disclosure
limitations-for example, notifying only a small number of
congresspersons and subjecting them to gag orders-might facilitate
candid and robust deliberation between branches. The intrinsic and
instrumental values of robust inter-branch deliberation might then be
realized.
Anti-disclosure arguments are yet more complicated with respect
to democratic deliberations that involve the public. Anti-disclosure
measures, of course, shield much information from the public. Yet
here, too, less than absolute disclosure limitations could be linked to
enhanced democratic deliberation. One might argue that it sometimes
may be appropriate for once non-public information to be made public,
but that such disclosures must first be carefully considered by the
executive branch or through a very contained inter-branch process.
Information disclosed through such processes may reflect more candid
and robust deliberations than those which would have followed from
more immediate public access.
ii. Arguments Favoring Disclosures
Broad disclosure rules arguably advance the intrinsic and
instrumental benefits of deliberation within the executive branch and
between the executive and legislative branches. Instrumentally, such
rules may foster more substantive, productive and forthright executive
branch deliberations because executive branch actors know that they
may be held accountable for their roles in the same. Similarly,
disclosures can improve inter-branch deliberations by providing
Congress with information to facilitate meaningful oversight of the
executive branch. The enhancement of intra-branch and inter-branch
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deliberations has intrinsic value as well, given the constitutional
significance of these deliberations in our indirect democracy.
Deliberations involving the public also are advanced by broad
disclosure requirements. First, to the extent that information is
disclosed publicly, public information flow is directly enhanced, which
in turn elevates the likelihood of informed public discourse. Second, to
the extent that information initially is disclosed non-publicly (say, to
members of Congress) under liberal disclosure rules that make eventual
public disclosure likely, informed public deliberations again are
enhanced. Increased public deliberation of course is associated with the
intrinsic and instrumental benefits of the same.
2. Initial Reflections on Maximizing the Benefits and Minimizing the
Costs of Secrecy and Openness Through Information Funneling Rules
Information funneling rules offer the possibility of compromise
between secrecy's costs and benefits. The implicit goal of such
compromise is meaningful oversight that serves democratic and
pragmatic ends while avoiding the costs to those ends of excessive
transparency. The theoretical connection between information
funneling and this goal is evident. Yet problems and uncertainties about
funneling remain, as the NSA surveillance controversy exemplifies.
While fool-proof rules surely are unattainable, improvements may be
achieved through better attention to the theoretical concerns and goals
underlying funneling and the connection between those factors and
funneling rules' details. This section suggests several considerations
that ought generally to inform the creation and application of funneling
rules.
a. Determining Who Should Receive Funneled Information
Directives regarding to whom information is funneled should be
reassessed to determine whether they match funneling's underlying
purposes. The need for such reassessment is illustrated by the NSA
surveillance controversy. It is reflected in the conflict over the
adequacy of notifying only the Gang of Eight, rather than the full
intelligence committees, of the program. 108 It also is reflected indirectly
in post-revelation conflicts over whether the Senate Intelligence
Committee should, like the Senate Judiciary Committee, hold hearings
108 See supra Part I.B.1.
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on the program. 10 9 The latter suggests a related question over how to
determine which committees should receive ongoing notice of
intelligence activities.
Two sets of concerns must be balanced to answer these questions.
On the one hand, restrictions on who receives notice must not
substantially undermine the very purpose of oversight. One complaint
about Gang of Eight notifications, for example, is that the Gang of Eight
as a group lacks the power to take recourse in response to what they've
been told.I10 A closely related complaint is that the group's small size,
combined with the absence of staffers in most briefings, makes
meaningful deliberation and even adequate grasp of the issues
unlikely."' On the other hand, requiring disclosure to broader groups
could cause one of at least three negative impacts on oversight goals.
First, it could cause leaking and thus endanger national security or
discourage executive branch candor in the instant or future briefings.
Second, it could enhance executive branch perceptions of the likelihood
of leaks. Those perceptions, even if incorrect, might lead to a lack of
executive branch candor or intransigence in providing witnesses or
requested documents. Third, and most cynically, it could provide the
executive branch with ex ante or ex post excuses for avoiding
disclosures. In short, broader disclosure requirements might enable the
administration more credibly to claim that it will not or did not share
information with Congress in order to protect the American people.
This analysis suggests two basic guidelines to follow in
determining to whom information should be funneled. First, the
notified group should be sufficient numerically and in terms of their
capacities and powers to have a real chance to influence the programs of
which they are informed. Similarly, the group should be sufficient in
size and capacity to understand the information conveyed and to
meaningfully deliberate about the same. Among other things, these
points suggest that the practice of excluding congressional staff
members from many intelligence briefings should be reconsidered.
Second, the group must be restricted sufficiently to minimize both the
actual and perceived chances of leaks. Means toward this goal might
include some reassessment of security clearance requirements. Such
means might also include better publicizing of any clearance or related
measures to enhance the political viability of congressional information
requests and the political costs of defying the same.
109 See, e.g., The Death of the Intelligence Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2006, at A22; Greg
Miller & Maura Reynolds, Spying Inquirv Blocked by GOP, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at Al
(main section).
110 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
I'' Id.
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b. Determining What Conditions to Impose on Those to Whom
Information Is Funneled
As important as determining who to inform is deciding what
restrictions should be imposed on information recipients. The same
basic considerations apply in making this determination as in deciding
who should receive information in the first place. That is, restrictions
must not significantly undermine the capacity of the informed to assess
and respond to the funneled information. At the same time, restrictions
must sufficiently protect against national security risks, the perception
of such risks and the overall likelihood of executive branch defiance.
One method that can help to strike this balance is the use of successive
information funnels. In other words, information might first be
funneled to a small group that is not permitted indiscriminately to
disclose information. That small group may, however, have the power
through majority vote or some other constraining mechanism to
determine that the information or parts thereof should be funneled on to
a different group. Successive funneling is considered further in Part III.
c. Enhancing Public Accountability Regarding Information
Disclosures
One problem reflected throughout this discussion is the near
absence of public accountability for behavior in the information
funneling process. This is an intrinsic difficulty with information
funneling."l 2 Non-public information sharing is, after all, non-public.
While funneling serves valuable purposes, its non-public nature can
cloak administration intransigence and a lack of engagement by
information recipients. This is reflected in the discourse about the
adequacy of administration disclosures to the Gang of Eight regarding
the NSA surveillance program and of member responses to those
disclosures.
Means to enhance public accountability in the information
funneling process while preserving the benefits of the process' non-
public nature should be considered. Successive information funneling
is one method toward this end. Where groups to whom information is
funneled have the capacity to vote on whether to release information
further, some incentive exists for administration cooperation to avoid
broader disclosure or to save face should such disclosure occur.
Similarly, some incentive exists for congresspersons to engage actively
112 See discussion and sources cited infra Part III.C.1.
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with disclosed information, both because broader disclosures eventually
could occur and because the very fact of funneling-if not the secret
information funneled-might be discussed publicly.
Delayed public disclosure rules also are worth considering. For
example, there might be a general rule making funneled disclosures and
the discussion surrounding them fully or partly public after some
number of years, with the disclosure time subject to case-by-case
variations. Similarly, it is worth considering whether the benefits of
limited record-keeping requirements in the funneling process-subject
also to delayed disclosure rules-might outweigh the costs of the same.
III. APPLYING THEORY TO PRACTICE: IMPROVING INFORMATION
FUNNELS
A. To Whom Should National Security Information Be Funneled and
under What, IfAny, Clearance Requirements?
1. Review of and Elaboration on Existing Requirements
The President and the intelligence agencies are statutorily required
to keep the "congressional intelligence committees... fully and
currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States,
including any significant anticipated intelligence activity. ' 113 This is to
be done with "due regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters."1 14 There
are separate and somewhat less stringent reporting requirements for
covert actions. 1 5 Covert actions are defined narrowly and do not
include intelligence acquisition.1 6 Initial notice of covert actions may
be limited to the "Gang of Eight" when the President deems it "essential
to limit access to [his report] to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting vital interests of the United States." ' 1 7 Such reports must,
however, be given to the "intelligence committees in a timely fashion"
along with a "statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice."' 18
The House and the Senate each are required to "establish, by rule
or resolution... procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all
classified information, and all information relating to intelligence
113 50 U.S.C.S. § 413(a)(1) (2007); see also id. § 413a(a)(1).
114 Id § 413a(a)(1).
115 Id. § 413b.
116 Id. § 413b(e).
117 Id. § 413b(c)(2).
118 Id. § 413 b(c)(3).
2008] 1073
CARDOZO LA W REVIEW
sources and methods, that is furnished to the intelligence committees or
to Members of Congress." 119  Members are not subject to security
clearance requirements in either congressional chamber. 1
20
Congressional employees are, however, subject to clearance
requirements to access classified information. 121 "The Senate Office of
Security mandates such requirements for all Senate employees needing
access to classified information."' 122 No one without the "appropriate
security clearances" may be employed by the Senate Intelligence
Committee. 123 House employees receiving classified information are
subject to office-specific clearance requirements. 124 House Intelligence
Committee Rules specify that "[C]ommittee Staff must have the
appropriate clearances prior to any access to compartmented
information."125
Each chamber also subjects members and employees accessing
classified information to non-disclosure requirements. The Senate
Intelligence Committee Rules forbid Committee members and
employees from disclosing non-public information except in accordance
with Committee or Senate disclosure rules. 126 Breach of this prohibition
is "grounds for referral to the Select Committee on Ethics."'127
Committee employees must sign an agreement to this effect. 128 The
House requires all Members, officers and employees of the chamber
who access classified information to take a non-disclosure oath. 129 A
committee-specific non-disclosure oath also is required of all
Intelligence Committee members and staff to access classified
information. 130 The House Intelligence Committee's Rules also forbid
the disclosure of classified information except pursuant to Committee or
House procedures.' 31 Committee staff members must sign agreements
119 Id. § 413(d).
120 FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION BY CONGRESS: PRACTICES AND PROPOSALS 5 (2006). Such requirements could
raise difficult questions regarding separation of powers should the clearance be done by the
executive branch. Id. Questions of political bias might arise if clearance were handled by a
congressional office or committee. Id.
121 Id. at 3.
122 Id.
123 149 CONG. REC. S2689, S2690 (Rule 10.1) (2003). See also id. at S2690 (Rule 9.5,
limiting classified information access to "staff members with appropriate security clearance and a
need-to-know, as determined by the Committee, and, under the Committee's direction, the Staff
Director and Minority Staff Director").
124 Kaiser, supra note 120, at 3.
125 149 CONG. REC. H5350, H5352 (Rule 14(c)).
126 149 CONG. REC. S2689, S2690 (Rule 9.6).
127 Id. (Rule 9.7.) See also S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8(d)-(e).
128 149 CONG. REC. S2689, S2690 (Rule 10.6-10.8).
129 Kaiser, supra note 120, at 3.
130 149 CONG. REC. H5350, H5352 (Rule 14(d)).
131 Id. (Rules 12-13).
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indicating that they will comply with these terms. 132
Each Chamber also takes measures to secure classified information
on its premises. The Senate centralizes such measures through its
Office of Senate Security whereas House measures are largely
committee and office generated. 133 In addition to any centralized Senate
measures, the Senate Intelligence Committee Rules require that staff
offices be secured with at least one security guard at all times 134 and that
sensitive or classified documents be segregated in a secure storage
area. 3 5  House Intelligence Committee Rules impose similar
requirements. Committee offices are secured and must be patrolled by
at least one U.S. Capitol Police officer at all times. 36  Classified
documents must be segregated in secure locations. 137
2. Rethinking the Circumstances in Which the Gang of Eight
Provisions Can Be Used
It is hard to justify limiting notice of intelligence activity to the
Gang of Eight on the basis of reasonable fears of information leakage
that could harm national security. Congress is considered to have a
reliable track record for non-leakage 138 and it has a political incentive to
avoid leaks in order to avoid blame by the executive branch for the
same. 139 Furthermore, the intelligence committees have a variety of
methods to protect classified information including staff clearance
policies, non-disclosure policies for members and office security
measures. 140 Executive branch claims of national security secrecy needs
also must be taken with a grain of salt given historical indications that
such claims are dramatically overused and that the executive branch
itself routinely leaks classified information for political reasons.141
There may, however, be reasons related to democratic deliberation
to permit Gang of Eight notice under very limited circumstances.
132 Id. (Rule 12(b)(l)).
133 Kaiser, supra note 120, at 2.
134 149 CONG. REC. S2689, S2690 (Rule 9.1).
'35 Id. (Rule 9.2).
136 149 CONG. REC. H5350, H5352 (Rule 14(a)(l)-(3)).
137 Id. (Rule 14(a)(4)-(7)).
138 See, e.g., Frederick M. Kaiser, Cong. Research Serv. Congressional Oversight of
Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives 13 (2007); L. BRITr SNIDER, SHARING SECRETS
WITH LAWMAKERS: CONGRESS AS A USER OF INTELLIGENCE 5 (1997), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/sharing-secrets-with-lawmakers-congress-as-a-user-of-intelligence/toc.htm.
139 See infra notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
140 See infra Part II1.A. 1.
141 See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Note, Keeping Secrets:
Congress, the Courts and National Security Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906, 910-14 (1990).
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Whether reasonable or not, fears may arise that the more persons
notified--even within the relatively secure realm of the intelligence
committees-the greater the likelihood of leakage. More cynically,
such fears may provide an easy and politically palatable excuse for
avoiding-or later explaining the avoidance of-disclosures. If no
alternative to full intelligence committee notice is provided, some
disclosures thus may simply not be made at all.
There are at least two responses to this conundrum. The first is for
Congress to eliminate the Gang of Eight exception to full committees
notice and simultaneously to make public cases for Congress'
constitutional prerogative to do so, for the relative safety of such a
change from a national security perspective, and for the risks to
democracy and national security of an under-informed Congress.
Admittedly, the odds may be against many in Congress willingly and
effectively spending political capital to argue these points, let alone to
simultaneously amend the Gang of Eight provisions. But given the
right political climate-which may exist now in light of the new
Democratic majorities in Congress and increasing public criticisms of
Bush Administration secrecy-and willing and able congresspersons
and others in government, academia and elsewhere, this is not an
inconceivable set of events.
Alternatively, a more moderate response might be offered. This
response would retain a statutory option to notify the Gang of Eight but
would resolve a statutory ambiguity to diminish the likelihood of that
option's abuse. Presently, the statutory text leaves unclear whether the
Gang of Eight option applies only to covert operations or to intelligence
operations generally. 142 The statute explicitly cites the option only with
respect to covert operations. 43 The statute also refers to the executive
branch's general responsibility to conduct its informing obligations with
"due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or
other exceptionally sensitive matters."' 144 As the NSA surveillance
controversy reflects, the latter provision-if interpreted to allow Gang
of Eight notice in lieu of full committees notice-gives the executive
branch substantially more leeway to justify limiting notice than does the
covert operations exception. The impact of this heightened leeway is
exacerbated by the fact that the due regard provision, which again
makes no reference to the Gang of Eight, also makes no reference to an
eventual requirement to notify the intelligence committee or to explain
the reasons for initially notifying a smaller group. 145 Such requirements
142 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
143 Id.




are outlined in the covert operations notice provisions. 146
One way to limit the Gang of Eight option would be to explicitly
extend it to "due regard" situations, while also extending the
accompanying requirements of eventual notice to the intelligence
committees and explanation of the lesser initial notice. Another
approach would be to clarify in the text that the "due regard" provision
does not encompass the Gang of Eight option. Before making the latter
change, though, consideration should be given to whether it would have
the perverse effect of increasing the occasions on which the executive
branch notifies no one at all. Such consideration should include
assessing whether other measures-such as increased pressure by
Congress to comply with notice requirements or the more formal
accountability-enhancing measures raised below-might mitigate such
effect.
3. When If Ever Should Staff Be Excluded?
Excluding staff from hearings seems no more reasonable from a
security-based perspective than does excluding members. Staff
employees work amidst the same physical security and under the same
non-disclosure agreements as do members. Unlike members, they also
are subject to pre-clearance requirements.147
Furthermore, staff presence often is necessary to make
information-sharing meaningful. Complex information about
intelligence programs may be incomprehensible to members, or
members may simply lack the time to sift through and make sense of the
information, without staff assistance. 148
As with member access, however, insistence on staff inclusion
poses the risk of heightened executive intransigence based on genuine
or pre-textual concerns about security or intra-executive branch
deliberative candor. 149 Means to balance this risk against the benefits of
staff inclusion thus should be considered.
The balance might be struck through a statutory presumption in
favor of staff access to statutorily required disclosures. The
presumption may, however, be overcome by executive branch objection
combined with a negotiated agreement as to terms between the
executive and involved congresspersons. The objection and the terms
of any negotiated agreement should be detailed in writing. As discussed
146 Id. § 413b(c).
147 See supra notes 121-137, 140-141 and accompanying text.
148 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
149 See supra Part III.A.2.
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below, 150 written documentation regarding disclosures can enhance
political accountability in the realm of information funneling,
particularly when the documentation is subject to the possibility of
public disclosure at some future point. 151 Thus, both the executive's
reasons for excluding staff and congressional responses to executive
objections might be documented, with such documentation subject to
public disclosure after a specific term of years or otherwise. 152 These
conditions might deter the executive branch from frivolously objecting
to staff inclusion and deter congresspersons from too readily
acquiescing in frivolous objections. At the same time, these
requirements would preserve the possibility of reasoned limitations on
staff access.
4. Which Committees Should Have Access to Information?
The NSA surveillance controversy also exposed difficulties that
arise when a committee with jurisdiction overlapping that of an
intelligence committee wishes to hold hearings, but lacks background
on or access to some of the complicated, classified matters involved.
These difficulties arose, most notably, when the Senate Intelligence
Committee declined to hold investigative hearings on the surveillance
program, 53 while the Senate Judiciary Committee held several hearings
to determine what had transpired and to consider responsive
legislation. 54  The Senate Judiciary Committee does not receive
statutorily required, ongoing notice as does (in theory) the Senate
Intelligence Committee. Staff and member expertise and member
clearance requirements also differ between the committees.1 55
Detailed assessment of which committees, beyond the Intelligence
Committees, should receive notice and on what basis they should
receive it is beyond this Article's scope. It is, however, worth flagging
the issue and suggesting two relevant factors that deserve consideration.
First, there is the question of whether any committees beyond the
150 See infra Part IlJ.C.2.a.
151 Id.
152 See id. for a more detailed discussion of the use of written documentation and possible
public disclosures of the same.
153 See Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Blocks Eavesdropping Probe, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2006,
at A3.
154 See, e.g., Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm. on Wartime Executive Power and the
National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority, 109 th Cong.; Hearing before the S. Judiciary
Comm. On Wartime Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority II, 109"h Cong.;
Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm. on NSA III: Wartime Executive Powers and the FISA
Court, 109"h Cong, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/scheduleall.cfm.




intelligence committees should receive statutorily mandated, ongoing
intelligence updates. 56  Broader regular disclosures' are rot novel.
Between 1974 and 1981, the President was required by statute to notify
"between six and eight congressional committees of covert intelligence
actions." 157 The statutory requirement was modified in 1981, "replacing
the reporting requirement to as many as eight committees with a general
requirement to keep the two intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of intelligence activities."' 158  A potential cost of broader
required disclosures is that the content and frequency of disclosures
generally will become diluted. This might be caused by increased
executive branch intransigence based on real or pre-textual concerns
about national security or intra-executive branch deliberative candor.
On the other hand, broader disclosures could spread information to
more committees and enable these committees to better do their
intelligence related work. Broader disclosures also might create healthy
intra-chamber competition between committees, reducing the possibility
of complacency or capture on the part of a single, information-
monopolizing committee. 159
Second, apart from the question of ongoing disclosures, there is the
question of what capacity committees other than the intelligence
committees should have to request, demand and share classified
information. Chambers-wide rules, combined with rules specific to
each chambers' intelligence agencies, offer a sound framework for
handling, requesting and considering broader disclosures of classified
information. 160 Some of these rules were elaborated on previously, 161
and others are elaborated on below. 162 There seems to be no good
reason not to apply similar, perhaps uniform, rules regarding classified
information across committees. To the extent that a committee rarely
needs to deal with classified information, the rules generally will be
irrelevant to that committee. But when classified information must be
dealt with, the benefits of the current rules (along with those of potential
amendments discussed herein) 163 should apply across committees. 164
156 For detailed discussion of the costs and benefits of expanding the number of committees
with jurisdiction to oversee the intelligence community see Anne Joseph O'Connell, The
Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/IJ World,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1691-99 (2006).
157 CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 11. See also Kaiser, supra note 138, at 12.
158 CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 32 n.31.
159 For a similar discussion regarding the potential costs and benefits of reducing the two
current Intelligence Committees to one Joint Committee, see Kaiser, supra note 138, at 9-13.
160 See supra Part III.A. l; infra Part 1lI.B.
161 See supra Part III.A.I.
162 See infra Part III.B.
163 See supra Part III.A.3; infra Parts 1l.B.2, III.C.2.
164 Cf O'Connell, supra note 156 at 1672 (noting that "[i]n July 2006, Representatives Jeff
Flake (R-AZ) and Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced a bill that would require the House
Intelligence Committee to disclose considerable classified information to at least eight other
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B. What Non-Disclosure Conditions Should Be Imposed on
Recipients of Funneled Information?
1. Existing Requirements
As explained above, the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees impose non-disclosure rules on members and employees.165
Disclosures may be made only pursuant to official procedures. These
procedures are successive funneling rules. Under these procedures, for
example, there are instances where non-committee members may access
committee information. The procedures also provide means for
committees or chambers to disclose classified information publicly.
a. Senate Rules
The Intelligence Committee may make classified information
available to other Senate Committees or individual Senators. Such
disclosures must be accompanied by a verbal or written notice
instructing recipients not to divulge such information except in
accordance with Committee or Chamber rules. 166 The Clerk of the
Committee must ensure that such notice is provided and must make a
written record of the information transmitted and the Committee or
Senators receiving it. 167
There are a detailed set of procedures by which classified
information in the Committee's possession may be disclosed publicly.
If a committee member requests public disclosure, then the Committee
must vote on whether to grant or deny the request. 68 If a majority of
the Committee votes to grant the request, then the Committee must
notify the Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate of this vote and
then must notify the President of the United States. 169 If the President
raises no objection to disclosure within five days, then the information
may publicly be disclosed. 70 If the President personally and in writing
objects to public disclosure, certifying that such disclosure so gravely
threatens the United States as to outweigh any public interest in the
House committees").
165 See supra Part II.A. 1.
166 149 CONG. REC. S2689, S2690 (Rule 9.4).
167 Id. See also S. Res 400, 94th Cong. § 8(c)(2) (1976).
168 S. Res 400, 94th Cong. § 8(a) (1976).
169 Id. at § 8(b)(1).
170 Id. at § 8(b)(2).
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same, then immediate public disclosure may not occur. 171 Instead, the
Majority and Minority leader jointly, or the Intelligence Committee by
majority vote, may refer the question to the full Senate. 72 If the
question is referred to it, then the full Senate must deliberate on the
matter in closed session. 73 Following the closed session, the Senate
publicly shall vote "on the disposition of such matter in open session,
without debate, and without divulging the information with respect to
which the vote is being taken.' 74  Any Senator may request
reconsideration of a vote for public disclosure.17 5
Unauthorized disclosures are subject to punishment by the Senate
Ethics Committee. 76  Penalties for Senators can include censure,
removal from a committee or expulsion from the Senate. 177 Penalties
for employees can include removal from employment or punishment for
contempt. 78
The Congressional Research Service and the Center for American
Progress both reported recently that the public disclosure provisions
have never been used by the Intelligence Committee. 179
b. House Rules
The House has a more detailed set of rules than does the Senate for
disclosures by Intelligence Committee Members. There is one set of
rules for disclosure to specified categories of Senators and
Representatives, one set of rules for disclosure to other Representatives
and one set of rules for disclosure to the full House in closed session.
There also is a separate set of rules for public disclosure.
Intelligence Committee Rules permit Committee members and
staff to disclose non-public matters with designated members and staff
of the Senate Intelligence Committee; the Chairpersons, ranking
minority members and designated staff persons of the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations; and the chairperson, ranking minority
member and designated staff persons on the Subcommittee on Defense
of the House Committee on Appropriations. 180 Committee members
and staff also may disclose limited types of non-public information with
171 Id. at § 8(b)(2), (3).
172 Id. at § 8(b)(3).
173 Id. at § 8(b)(5).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id. at § 8(d).
177 Id. at § 8(e).
178 Id.
179 Kaiser, supra note 138, at 8; CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 27.
180 149 CONG. REC. H5350, H5353(Rule 12(a)(3)(A)).
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the chairpersons, ranking minority members and designated staff of the
House and Senate Committees on Armed Services1 81 and with the
chairpersons, ranking minority members and designated staffs of certain
subcommittees of the House Appropriations Committee. 182
Other non-committee-member Representatives may access non-
public committee information upon written request to the Committee's
Chief Clerk and upon approval by the Committee of the request. 183 The
requesting Representative must be given a non-disclosure oath and must
agree in writing not to disclose any classified information except in
accordance with House or Committee rules. 184
When the Intelligence Committee discloses information to other
Committees or to non-committee Representatives, the Committee's
"Director of Security and Registry... [must] maintain a written record
identifying the.., material provided... , the reasons agreed upon by
the Committee for approving such transmission, and the name of the
committee or Member ... receiving such document or material."' 185
At the request of a Committee member, the Committee may
determine that a matter involving non-public information "requires the
attention of all Members of the House."' 186 In making this decision, the
Committee may consult other committees or executive branch
officials. 187 If the committee determines that disclosure to the full
House is warranted, it may request a closed session of the House for this
purpose. 188
As an alternative to requesting a closed House session, the
Committee may determine that the information should be made
public. 189 The Committee first must vote on the matter.190 If they vote
for public disclosure, they must notify the President of the United States
of this fact. 191 If the President does not object within five days of
notice, then public disclosure may occur.192 If the President objects
personally and in writing within five days, then the Committee may
determine, by majority vote, to refer the matter to the full House. 193
After such referral, the House must determine, in closed session,
181 Id. (Rule 12(a)(3)(B)).
182 Id. (Rule 12(a)(3)(C)).
183 Id. (Rule 14(f(l)-(3)).
184 Id. (Rule 14(0(4)).
185 Id. (Rule 14(o)).
186 Id. (Rule 14(g)(1), (2), (h)(i)).
187 Id. (Rule 14(g)(3), (4)).
188 Id. (Rule 14(j)(2)(A)).
189 Id. (Rule 14(j)(2)(B)).
190 Id. (Rule X, Clause I l(g)(l)).
191 Id. (Rule X, Clause I l(g)(2)).
192 Id. (Rule X, Clause 1 l(g)(2)(B)).
193 Id. (Rule X, Clause I l(g)(2)(C)).
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whether the information should be disclosed publicly. 194 The House
then must vote on the question in open session, "but without divulging
the information with respect to which the vote is taken."' 95
The Center for American Progress reports that the House
Intelligence Committee, like its counterpart in the Senate, has never
made use of its public disclosure provisions. 196
2. Commentary on Existing Requirements
On their faces, the existing requirements seem to soundly balance
the costs and benefits of information disclosures. Information funneling
to the intelligence community is made potentially more consequential,
and hence more meaningful, by the opportunities for members
successively to funnel information to other congresspersons and to the
public. At the same time, the multiple stages of voting and consultation
required for public disclosure and the limitations placed on informed
congresspersons seem sufficient to allay reasonable concerns about
national security or the integrity of intra-executive branch discussions.
What is less clear, however, is that the requirements work well in
practice. We know from recent reports that neither chamber has used its
public disclosure option. 197 I have yet to come across information on
whether, how often, and to what effect the successive funneling rules
are used to convey information within Congress. With respect to the
latter, it is clear at least that any executive branch failures to deliver
information to the full intelligence committees has the secondary
consequence of keeping those committees from sharing information
within Congress. It also stands to reason that the same political
disincentives that discourage Committee members from pushing for
initial disclosures may negatively impact their willingness to
successively funnel whatever information they receive.
An initial question is whether there are formal changes that can be
made to the rules dictating to whom disclosures must be made to
enhance successive funneling's effectiveness. One such change would
involve clarifying the scope of the Gang of Eight exception. Disclosure
to the full intelligence committees is, after all, a prerequisite to
committees' invoking their prerogative to disclose further.
Requirements that regular disclosures be made to additional committees
also are considered above. 198 Beyond that, it is not apparent that new
194 Id. (Rule X, Clause I l(g)(2)(F)).
195 Id. (Rule X, Clause I l(g)(2)(G)).
196 CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 27.
197 See supra notes 179, 196 and accompanying text.
198 See supra Part III.A.4.
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rules would positively impact the factors-such as tendencies toward
executive intransigence and congressional lack of will-that make
current requirements less than fully effective. For example, were the
public disclosure rules altered so that a committee could order public
disclosure on its own, in the face of Presidential objections, democratic
deliberation and its benefits might suffer rather than be helped. Such a
change could upset the balance between openness' costs and benefits by
making the executive branch even more reluctant than it already is to
disclose information to the intelligence committees.
The most effective changes might be those that do not affect
funneling requirements directly-that is, that do not directly alter rules
as to who must be notified and when. Rather, the most effective
changes might be those that increase Congress' political incentives to
use existing requirements and the executive branch's incentives to
comply with the same. The next subpart addresses the relative lack of
political accountability and incentives in intelligence oversight. It
considers formal and informal changes to improve the situation.
C. The Public Accountability and Political Incentive Factors
1. Existing Situation and Requirements
Logic suggests, and experience bolsters the notion, that there
generally is low or even negative political incentive for Congress to
push the executive branch to disclose national security information.
The non-public nature of much information funneling means that
"Congressional efforts here remain largely hidden" and thus politically
unhelpful to its participants. 9 9  The complexity of much national
security information also diminishes its political resonance.2 00
Furthermore, the charge that information disclosure will harm national
security is easy to make and has substantial popular appeal, making it
politically risky to push for disclosures. 20' Indeed, the current
administration frequently makes the charge that congressional hearings
on national security will provide "the enemy" with valuable
199 Kaiser, supra note 138, at 22. See also CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 28. This
exacerbates the additional incentive problem that intelligence policy oversight "may have only
marginal direct effects on Members' constituencies, districts, or states." Kaiser, supra note 138,
22.
200 CAP REPORT, supra note 5 1, at 28.
201 See, e.g., KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE SECRET GOVERNMENT 6,68, 71, 89,
140, 149-151, 160-61, 164-67, 170, 183-84, 186-87 (1996) (discussing public appeal of secrecy);
Kitrosser, supra note 42, at 531 n. 199 and accompanying text (citing polling that "suggests that




information. 20 2 Fears that the executive branch will intentionally leak
national security information and blame Congress for the leak also have
been known to exist on Capitol Hill.20 3
Nonetheless, there are some formal and informal factors that may
enhance Congress' political incentives to conduct meaningful oversight.
One set of formal requirements are the successive funneling rules
described above in Subpart B. The possibility that a Committee
majority might at some point vote to make information more widely
available, even public, creates some incentive to act responsibly lest
one's intransigence become widely known. Of course, these successive
funneling requirements themselves run into political accountability
problems. Such problems likely account for the fact that neither
intelligence committee has used its formal power to publicize classified
information. 20 4 Successive funneling rules might, however, contribute
to a structure that facilitates political accountability overall. The impact
of successive funneling rules, and the strength of an overall political
accountability structure, might thus be heightened as other elements of
the structure are enhanced.
Another relevant set of formal factors are requirements that some
funneled information be in writing. Once information is in writing, it
becomes harder for writers or recipients to distance themselves from it
if it ever is revealed. The statutory funneling rules at present contain
some in-writing requirements. For example, the intelligence agencies
are required to "keep the congressional intelligence committees fully
and currently informed of all ... significant anticipated intelligence
activity and any significant intelligence failure." 205 Such reports must
be in writing.20 6 Similarly, certain Presidential findings must be made
to justify a covert action and such findings generally must be submitted
in writing to the intelligence committees.20 7 While delays in notice or
temporarily limited notice are permitted, such delays or limitations must
eventually be explained in writing.20 8
Factors less formal than statutory and committee rules can also
impact political accountability. The political climate, of course, can be
very significant. Indeed, the mid to late 1970s has been called a high
point for congressional oversight of national security. This
characterization is attributed largely to the well-known executive branch
abuses, often under the guise of national security, of the late 1960s and
202 See, e.g., sources cited at supra note 67.
203 CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 27. Cf OLMSTED, supra note 201, at 156.
204 See supra notes 179, 196-197 and accompanying text.
205 50 U.S.C.S § 413a(a)(I) (2007).
206 Id. § 413a(b).
207 Id. § 413b(a)(1) (2007).
208 Id. § 413b(a)(I), (c).
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early 1970s.20 9 These events are thought to have generated an unusually
high public tolerance, even appetite, for oversight of the executive
branch. 210 Of course, the political climate cannot by itself ensure
effective oversight. Other necessary factors include a Congress that is
not paralyzed from acting by partisanship or by other political
disincentives. As Walter Mondale, who as a senator contributed
substantially to the intelligence oversight of the 1970s notes, no one can
force Congress to have courage. 21' Political and congressional cultures
are crucial components of effective oversight. The relevant questions
are what if anything might do done to improve oversight cultures and
what role if any might formal rule changes play in such improvements.
2. Possible New Approaches
a. Some Additions to In-Writing Requirements and Public Disclosure
Rules
Existing rules include some in-writing requirements and the
possibility of eventual public disclosure. As noted, both devices have
the potential to enhance accountability, although both have had limited
impact thus far. There may be ways to build on these requirements to
enhance their effectiveness without unduly risking increased executive
branch intransigence.
Two changes to the existing devices come to mind-one building
on in-writing requirements and one building on public disclosure rules.
With respect to the former, the executive branch presently must put
most of its obligatorily disclosed information-including its regular
reports to the intelligence committees and its covert action reporting-
in writing. It might be worth exploring a parallel in-writing requirement
reflecting congresspersons' responses to the information. Any such
requirement should be vague and undemanding so as not to be too
onerous or to discourage compliance-something to the effect that:
"[C]ongresspersons receiving information must, in writing,
acknowledge receipt of the same. In the same document, receiving
congresspersons may record any responses on their part to the
information, including any responsive actions taken or follow-up
discussions had." Such requirements would be subject to the same
confidentiality and security procedures to which written executive
branch disclosures are subject.
209 See, e.g., OLMSTED, supra note 201, at 182-83; CAP REPORT, supra note 51, at 9-12.
210 See sources cited supra note 209.
211 Interview with Walter Mondale, former U.S. Vice-President, at Dorsey and Whitney in
Minneapolis, Minn. (Mar. 1, 2007) (subsequent e-mail confirmation of this statement dated June
17, 2007, on file with author).
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The accountability-enhancing effect of in-writing requirements
depends on the likelihood that others will, at some point, see the written
information and draw from it views as to whether the executive branch
complied with its obligations, whether congresspersons pushed for such
compliance and whether individual congresspersons were engaged in
the relevant debates. Existing successive funneling rules contribute to
these ends. Serious consideration also should be given to creating
presumptive public disclosure/de-classification dates for information
funneled to the intelligence committees. This is analogous to the
practice within the executive branch of placing presumptive de-
classification dates on some information, with the presumption subject
to reversal. 212 Presumptive disclosure dates might make the possibility
of eventual public disclosure much more real to participants and
enhance the likelihood of compliance and engagement. At the same
time, the possibility of rebutting the presumption combined with
sufficiently distant dates-say, 5-10 years after initial disclosure-
should alleviate reasonable concerns about national security or the
integrity of executive branch discussions. Existing provisions for public
disclosure upon special committee or chamber action can serve as a
backup mechanism for cases where immediate public disclosure is
warranted.
b. Broader Changes to Committees Structure and Stature
The Congressional Research Service reports that Congress recently
"has pursued ... initiatives for changing its intelligence oversight
structure and capabilities. ' 213 One category of changes would enhance
committees' influence over appropriation decisions. For example, "[a]
recent change in the House places three members of the intelligence
committee on a new Select Intelligence Oversight Panel on the
Appropriations Committee. The new panel, which appears
unprecedented in the history of Congress, is to study and make
recommendations to relevant appropriations subcommittees. '214
Another category of changes would combine the intelligence
committees to create one Joint Committee with enhanced powers,
influence and stature.2 15 A third set of changes would "[g]rant the
current select committees status as standing committees, along with
212 See, e.g., Information Security Oversight Office, 2005 Report to the President 14 (2006),
available at www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2005rpt.pdf (describing current presumption, under executive
order, that certain materials should be declassified after 25 years).
213 Kaiser, supra note 138, at summary page.
214 Id. at 3.
215 Id. at 6-13.
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indefinite tenure for their membership, to reduce turnover; increase
experience, stability, and continuity; and make membership on the panel
more attractive. '216  Another recommendation would expand
committees' "authority, giving them power to report appropriations as
well as authorizations and to hold subpoena authority on their own. 217
Detailed analysis of committee changes not directly related to
information funneling is beyond this Article's scope. It suffices to note,
however, that changes that bolster the committees' general powers,
stature, influence and competence may positively impact information
flow to and within the committees. By heightening committees'
prestige, visibility and abilities, such changes could increase the
political incentives for committees to demand information and for the
executive branch to comply with such demands.218
c. Informal Changes: Speaking Out and Educating the Public
Formal changes are unlikely to be very effective without some
change in public and politicians' perceptions of the meaning and
consequences of national security based arguments for secrecy. It
would be refreshing to see congresspersons and others more vigorously
tout Congress' secret-protecting infrastructure and track record and
more consistently remind the public about the dangers of too much
secrecy as well as too much openness and historical and current
tendencies toward massive over classification.
Polling and focus group data suggest that the public generally is
very supportive of open government, even on issues relating to national
security, but that "attitudes shift" "when the government claims the
information could help terrorists. 2 19 For example, "[o]ver 90% [of
persons polled by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research in January 2002]
stated that in the aftermath of 9/11 environmental right-to-know laws
should be strengthened or left [sic] the same. Yet when the question
was refrained as do you agree with Bush or EPA removing information
from public access to protect homeland security, 67% said they
agreed." 220
It is not remotely unreasonable, of course, for anyone to wish to
block information that could assist terrorists. The problem is the ease
216 Id. at 14.
217 Id.
218 For detailed analysis of proposed changes see O'Connell, supra note 156, at 1671-84,
1691-99, 1710-16, 1724-27.
219 Gary D. Bass & Sean Moulton, The Bush Administration's Secrecy Policy: A Call to
Action to Protect Democratic Values 5-7, (OMB Watch, Working Paper, 2002), available at
http://www.ombwatch.org/rtk/secrecy.pdf.
220 Id. at 6.
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with which such claims are made, the evidence suggesting massive
abuse of such claims, and the very real risks to national security and
democracy posed by too much secrecy.
Existing rules and statutes provide a framework to balance
secrecy's benefits and risks through inter-branch competition and
discussion. As explained throughout this Article, these rules and
statutes can be improved further. But neither the existing framework
nor enhanced versions thereof will work so long as Congress fails to use
it, to insist on executive branch compliance with it, and to refocus
public debate by educating the public as to this framework and its safety
and necessity.
CONCLUSION
It is crucial, perhaps now more than ever, to reconcile legitimate
executive branch secrecy needs with the devastating political and
practical consequences of an uninformed Congress and public. When
national security information belongs exclusively to the executive
branch, it becomes dangerously easy to persuade Congress and the
public simply to "'trust the President because only he [He?] knows the
facts.' ' 221 Indeed, there are substantial political incentives for
Congress 22 2 and psychological incentives for the public 223 to acquiesce
in this view.
Because funneling rules plainly are directed at balancing the
advantages of openness and secrecy, they may be uniquely equipped not
only to achieve this substantive end, but to overcome the political and
psychological barriers to so doing. With respect to the former, carefully
crafted funneling rules might help to ensure necessary information-
sharing while protecting national security and meaningful deliberation.
With respect to the latter, openness rules can not be passed or enforced
without sufficient political incentive on the part of the relevant players.
By crafting improved funneling rules and vigorously championing them
to the public, to others in Congress, and to executive branch officers,
congresspersons can help to bolster and harness those incentives.
Indeed, it is important for congresspersons not only to engage the
public in seeking to pass new funneling rules, but to engage them
regularly on matters of government secrecy and executive branch
information-sharing. Ideally, funneling rules might have a dynamic and
ongoing relationship with the political process. Government secrecy
must have a degree of political resonance for funneling rules to be
221 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 331 (1973).
222 See supra at III.C. 1.
223 See id.
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crafted, improved and enforced in the first place. At the same time,
their very existence and success may increase their political resonance
and the political costs to politicians of violating them or acquiescing in
their violation.
In short, well crafted and publicly debated funneling rules hold
some promise to attack unwarranted secrecy on two fronts. First, the
rules themselves may be conducive to meaningful information-sharing.
Second, the rules may become foci for an ongoing public debate on the
risks of excessive government secrecy and the means to balance secrecy
and openness. Should funneling rules help to awaken the public to the
dangers of unchecked government secrecy, that may prove their most
important and enduring contribution.
